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International Legal Updates
United States
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation:
The Mérida Initiative
The Mérida Initiative is a central element in a broader strategy of growing
cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico
to address the shared threat presented by
organized crime. Major drug cartels control
the narcotics trade in Mexico, and demand
for drugs in the U.S. is a significant catalyst for their continued trafficking across
the border. Additionally, the drug cartels
purchase weapons in the U.S. and smuggle
them into Mexico. The Mérida Initiative
will allow the U.S. to provide significant
support to Mexico as the fight against drug
crime in Mexico grows more and more
violent.
In October 2007, former U.S. President
George W. Bush announced the Mérida
Initiative to “.  .  . combat the threats of drug
trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.” Signed
into law on June 30, 2008, the initiative
includes aid for seven Central American
countries including Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. The Mérida Initiative
provides $1.4 billion over three years in
equipment and training from the U.S. to
the Mexican government to support both
law enforcement efforts directed against
organized crime and long-term institution
building for federal police and the judicial
system.
Mexican President Felipe Calderón, who
took office in 2006, implemented an aggressive law enforcement strategy against organized crime and took significant steps to
make the federal police more effective and
dependable. The increased police presence
has led to serious human rights violations by
authorities. Civil society groups have gone
before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) to demand the
investigation and punishment of torture and
sexual abuse committed by state authorities
during police operations at several locations, including Oaxaca and Jalisco. The
Mexican government has acknowledged
that Mexico’s National Human Rights

Commission received over 200 reports of
human rights violations that occurred in a
large-scale police operation in the Mexican
town of San Salvador Atenco in 2006. The
Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights
Center represents eleven women before the
IACHR. One is Maria Patricia Romero who
spent two years in prison after her convictions for insulting police and carrying prohibited weapons during an operation in San
Salvador Atenco, Mexico State.
Although the aid package is largely in
the form of military assistance, the Mérida
Initiative requires the Mexican government
to meet several benchmarks that address
the human rights violations taking place.
Specifically, the legislation prohibits 15%
of the funds from being disbursed until
the U.S. State Department reports that the
Mexican government is (1) improving the
transparency and accountability of police
forces; (2) ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and prosecuting members of federal
police and military forces credibly alleged
to have committed human rights violations; (3) enforcing the prohibition against
using testimony obtained through torture
as evidence in court; and (4) establishing a mechanism for regular consultation
between the Mexican government and civil
society to monitor implementation of the
Mérida Initiative.

Wage Discrimination
Safeguards
The U.S. Congress recognizes that
“despite the enactment of the Equal Pay
Act in 1963, many women continue to earn
significantly lower pay than men for equal
work. In many instances, the pay disparities
can only be due to continued intentional
discrimination or the lingering effects of
past discrimination.” The Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act gives individuals more time
to file lawsuits claiming job discrimination.
The Paycheck Fairness Act makes it easier
for women to prove violations of the Equal
Pay Act of 1963.
Lilly Ledbetter worked as an area manager at Goodyear, a position mostly held
by men. After several years, her salary
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became significantly less than the salaries of the male managers with equal or
less experience. “Ledbetter was the only
woman working as an area manager and
the pay discrepancy between Ledbetter and
her 15 male counterparts was stark,” stated
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. The 2007
Supreme Court decision ruled that employees subject to pay discrimination must file
a claim within 180 days of the employer’s
original decision to pay them less. Even if
the employee continued to receive reduced
paychecks or did not discover the discriminatory reduction in pay until after the 180
days, the individual was still subject to the
180-day limitation.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, signed
into law by President Barack Obama on
January 29, 2009, effectively reverses the
Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision by
allowing individuals to file complaints 180
days after any discriminatory paycheck or
practice occurs. In other words, each new
paycheck violates the law if it is the result
of a discriminatory decision made in the
past. Individuals can also receive back pay
as compensation for discrimination that
occurred up to two years preceding the filing of the complaint.
In addition to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act, the House of Representatives
passed the Paycheck Fairness Act introduced by Representative Rosa DeLauro
and former Senator Hillary Clinton in 2007.
The Senate is still debating the bill which
would provide more effective remedies to
victims of discrimination when the payment of wages was based on the sex of
the individual. The bill seeks to allow
unlimited punitive and compensatory damage awards under the Equal Pay Act, even
when the wage disparity is unintentional.
The bill calls for a study of data collected
by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission related to employee pay information for use in the enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination.
It also proposes voluntary guidelines for
employers on how to evaluate jobs with the
goal of eliminating unfair disparities. President Obama supports this bill and is eager
to sign it into law once it passes the Senate.
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The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and Paycheck Fairness Act ensure that women like
Ms. Ledbetter and other victims of pay
discrimination can effectively challenge
unequal pay.

Enhanced Measures to Combat
Human Trafficking
United States Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney stated, “Thousands of
human trafficking victims are being held
in often deplorable conditions in cities and
towns throughout America. Let there be no
mistake: human trafficking is modern-day
slavery.” The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008 enhances measures to combat human trafficking domestically and
around the world. The legislation reauthorizes funding for the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000. The legislation
directs the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Department of State, and
the Department of Defense. It incorporates
anti-trafficking and protection measures for
vulnerable populations, particularly women
and children, into their post-conflict and
humanitarian emergency assistance and
program activities. The legislation includes
language for targeting prostitution, slave
labor, and forced child soldiers, as these are
all interrelated to human trafficking.
From the years 2001 to 2007, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and U.S Attorneys’ Offices prosecuted
156 trafficking cases, securing 342 convictions and rescuing more than 1400 victims.
The DOJ has brought together federal,
state, and local law enforcement investigators and prosecutors, along with social services agencies, to help identify and rescue
all kinds of trafficking victims and to punish offenders. Congresswoman Maloney
further stated, “The bipartisan Wilberforce
Act will dramatically strengthen our efforts
to fight human trafficking, giving prosecutors the tools they need to hold traffickers
accountable and providing a helping hand
to victims, as well.” The law specifically
enhances systemic measures, tools for prosecutors, and help for victims.
One systemic improvement is the creation of a system for rating countries to
help gauge the progress made in combating human trafficking. The U.S. Department of State produces reports that cover
all countries’ compliance with minimum
standards to combat human trafficking.

The law allows the U.S. to withhold technical and monetary assistance if a country
fails to meet those minimum standards of
improvement. The legislation also calls for
studies of the commercial sex industry and
the psychological and medical conditions
of victims.
To assist with prosecution, the law
expands federal jurisdiction to U.S. citizens and permanent residents who commit
forced labor or sex trafficking crimes while
they were living abroad. The law requires
prosecutors to show “reckless disregard for
the victim” in order to convict traffickers,
making it easier to prosecute offenders.
It also places restrictions on offenders’
passports for cross-border crimes, thus preventing them from leaving the country to
escape prosecution.
The Act allows trafficking victims to
seek reparations and civil damages from
anyone profiting from them in an attempt
to reduce the incentives to engage in human
trafficking. It also expands the eligibility
for visas and non-visa status for trafficking
victims and their families, enabling more
individuals to reside in the U.S. and permit
them to receive federal benefits. This is a
significant provision in that it allows trafficking victims, commonly smuggled by
force into the U.S., to stay in the country
without fear of immigration proceedings.
The Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Labor, immigration and
trafficking experts, and the Congressional
Budget Office project that these provisions
will enable 100–150 additional people per
year to become eligible for benefits—
such as Medicaid—available to refugees
sooner than they could have prior to the
legislation.

Latin America
Peru: Fujimori Awaits
Verdict after Yearlong Trial
Prosecutors and defense lawyers gave
final arguments in the trial against former
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori on
January 12, 2009 in Lima. Fujimori stands
accused of directing a dirty war against
Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist guerilla insurgency that his administration ultimately
crushed, at the expense of many civilian
lives. The charges allege that he authorized
specific human rights abuses throughout
his decade in power. Now 70 and ailing,
Fujimori faces up to 30 years in jail if con-
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victed. He has repeatedly denied charges
and openly professed his innocence, stating,
“I never ordered the death of anybody.”
The trial addresses two high-profile
massacres carried out by “La Colina,” an
Army Intelligence Service death squad
allegedly under Fujimori’s direct control
during the height of the counterinsurgency
campaign. In 1991, La Colina raided a
barbeque in a poor suburb of Lima, killing
15 people, including a young boy. Then, in
1992, the group kidnapped and summarily executed nine students and a professor
from La Cantuta University. Their remains
were discovered in an unmarked grave.
Fujimori is also charged with ordering
the illegal detention of journalist Gustavo
Gorriti and of businessman Samuel Dyer,
both in 1992. Cesar Nakazaki, Fujimori’s
principal lawyer, has admitted that, “a conviction is a possible scenario,” but asserted
that the prosecutors “have not proved that
ex-president Fujimori created policies violating human rights, nor that he created and
controlled the Colina group.”
Lawyers representing families of the
victims have expressed fears over the independence of Peru’s Supreme Court and of
Lima’s High Court. The presidents of both
courts have expressed favorable views of
leaders closely tied to Fujimori. Javier
Villa Stein, who has been president of the
Supreme Court since January 1, 2009, is in
a particularly influential position. As president, Villa Stein will play a major role in
selecting the panel of judges that will have
ultimate discretion in permitting Fujimori’s
appeal, should he choose to contest the
eventual verdict. One lawyer representing
the families of the victims lamented, “the
president of the Supreme Court has already
expressed his views on the validity of evidence presented in the legal proceedings
against Fujimori administration officials,
which means that for the sake of independence, autonomy, and objectivity of the
judiciary, he should have nothing to do
with this trial.”
Other concerns about Villa Stein’s
impartiality surround his past clients. As an
attorney, Villa Stein defended two former
owners of newspapers who received funds
through a program under Fujimori’s direct
control. Villa Stein also provided legal
assistance to Fujimori’s former attorney
general Blanca Colán and to his former
army chief José Villanueva, both of whom
have been convicted of corruption. Another
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lawyer representing the victims’ families
summed up his concerns, saying, “I would
have preferred another justice to be selected
as Supreme Court president, someone who
could guarantee that there is no threat of
distortion in the process, but regretfully that
did not happen.”
The yearlong trial, which has been continuously televised via a live courtroom
feed, has divided Peru. Many Peruvians
view Fujimori with a lingering sense of
loyalty, as their past president who defeated
a brutal insurgency and revived an economy ravaged by inflation. Others, however,
view Fujimori’s ten-year reign as autocratic
and corrupt. Fujimori rose to power through
a grassroots campaign that appealed to
Peru’s poor. In his effort to avert a bloody
revolution, Fujimori suspended democracy
to seize dictatorial powers in his infamous
autogolpe (“self-coup”). Fujimori resigned
from the presidency in 2000 via fax from a
hotel room in Japan after videos surfaced
showing his de-facto head of intelligence
Vladimir Montesinos bribing prominent
politicians. A verdict is expected in the
second or third week of March.

Up to 40,000 Working in
Slave-Like Conditions in Brazil
The Brazilian Labor Ministry reports in
January 2009 that its anti-slavery taskforce
released more than 4,600 people forced into
slavery on fazendas (ranches) in 255 raids
during 2008. The National Conference of
Brazilian Bishops (CNBB, after its Portuguese acronym) estimates that the government has freed over 7,000 slaves since
2003. Despite increased public awareness
and policing efforts, fazendas with slavelike conditions persist.
The vast and sparsely populated jungles
of the Amazon in northern Brazil create
ideal conditions for forced labor. Despite
daily domestic and international flights to
Manaus and Belém—two regional metropolises—travel to rural areas of the Amazon remains difficult. Recruiters known as
gatos (“cats”), lure impoverished laborers
to work on far-away fazendas. The journey
by bus and boat takes several days, but
laborers persevere with promises of high
pay, steady work, food, lodging, and in
some instances, small cash advances. When
laborers arrive, many are already in debt as
employers may charge for the expenses of
the arduous journey. Workers remain in a
perpetual cycle of debt because wages often

cannot cover expenses. Fleeing is simply
not an option as the fazendas are in remote
locations. Moreover, ranchers warn that
errant workers will be found and returned,
if they escape, to repay their debts.
Determining the precise number of
workers laboring in slave-like conditions
has been difficult. The CNBB’s Pastoral
Land Commission estimates that there are
between 25,000 and 40,000 workers in a
state of forced labor. The Brazilian government has drawn up a National Action
Plan and passed a number of initiatives
that make it easier for numerous bodies
and organizations to work together. Brazil
entered a cooperation agreement with the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to
establish a series of training seminars for
judges. The problem persists, but many
authorities agree that the issue has become
far more public. Public awareness is higher
because the issue is discussed in the press
and through advertising campaigns on
television.
A continuing impetus behind this form
of slavery is Brazil’s booming ethanol
industry. Brazil is the biggest exporter of
ethanol in the world, and the second biggest
producer. The fuel is extracted from sugarcane, and there are allegations that slave
laborers work the sugar cane fields. “You
cannot dismiss the fact that sugar cane cutters are transported and housed worse than
animals, forced to work around the clock
to exhaustion and even to death,” remarked
one church group.

Guatemala Continues to
Struggle with Violence, though
with Some Progress
Calixto Simón Cun, a thirty-seven-yearold Guatemalan man, became the first
person prosecuted under a new law combating “femicide” and other forms of gender violence on February 7, 2009. The
judge sentenced Cun to five years in prison
for abusing his spouse. The Guatemalan
National Congress passed Decree 22-08
in April 2008 which defines femicide as
“the violent death of a woman, occasioned
within the context of an unequal relationship between men and women.” Moreover,
femicide is “a homicide qualified by gender-based power exerted over a woman [by
a man].” In a nation that struggles to break
the cycles of violence, women are particularly vulnerable. In 2008, 722 “femicides”
were reported. Presently, the police squad
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charged with investigating gender violence
is pursuing over 2000 leads.
December 12, 2008 marked the second
anniversary of the UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in
Guatemala (CICIG, the acronym for its
name in Spanish). CICIG framers sought to
create a tribunal that would independently
investigate organized crime. The CICIG
seeks to prosecute and punish illegal security groups and clandestine organizations
and aims to strengthen domestic institutions
such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The
CICIG has authority to enter into agreements with the Public Prosecutor’s Office,
the Supreme Court, and other institutions.
Two years after its creation, however,
the CICIG lacks the efficacy to fulfill its
mandate. The CICIG was denied the power
of subpoena or indictment in a series of
compromises with the government and
lacks a witness protection program. Some
concessions were needed for the CICIG to
survive once the Guatemalan Constitutional
Court determined that the CICIG violated
national sovereignty; however, these limitations have undermined the CICIG’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Moreover, the
CICIG has been slow to begin work; it
only recently received its full complement
of 60 investigators and 30 lawyers. These
new additions have the potential to play
important roles in transforming a culture of
impunity once they begin to take test cases.
If successful, the CICIG may serve as a
model for other countries emerging from
civil war, but given its limited powers, the
CICIG faces an uphill battle.
CICIG structural deficiencies are unfortunate, as Guatemala suffers from a murder
rate of 43 murders per 100,000 people,
making it one of the world’s most violent
countries according to a 2007 government
estimate. The problem is compounded by
an ineffective justice system. For example,
in neighboring El Salvador charges are
filed in 45 percent of murders; in Guatemala that figure is just 2 percent. For
a country of 12 million, Guatemala has
only 26,000 police officers—many without
cars and radios—and 12,000 employees in
the public prosecutor department, and the
national police force and law enforcement
bodies are woefully underfunded. Although
President Alvaro Colom has sought to
combat corruption by firing hundreds of
police and bringing in new defense and
interior ministers, CICIG and the Guatema-

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6
lan government will have to work together
to develop a functional, sustainable judicial
system.

Africa
Politics Cloud Pursuit of
Justice in Struggle between
Rwanda and France
Most international criminal prosecution
is political. But, topping recent charts are
a series of indictments, international warrants, and tit-for-tat politics culminating
in Rwandan Minister of Protocol Rose
Kabuye standing trial in France beginning
January 28, 2009. Kabuye is one of nine
senior Rwandan officials closely allied
with President Paul Kagame who were
indicted in France for alleged involvement
in the assassination of former Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana, the event generally recognized as triggering the 1994
Rwandan genocide. Kagame could not be
included in the indictment because French
law immunizes sitting heads of state.
The indictment was issued by controversial French antiterrorism judge JeanLouis Bruguière on November 20, 2006.
Bruguière’s indictment of current senior
Rwandan officials who have their political
roots in the Tutsi guerilla army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), runs counter to
the more widely accepted view that blames
Hutu extremists for Habyarimana’s assassination. Bruguière, formerly an investigating judge and First Vice-President of
the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris
(who since retired from the court to go
into politics), began his investigation in
1998. During the eight-year investigation,
as Rwandan officials are quick to point
out, he did not once come to Rwanda. The
resulting 2006 indictment is criticized for
failing to meet standards of objectivity
and impartiality required in the investigation of a civil judge. Some suspect it is
politically motivated. Others, however,
praise Bruguière for challenging the popular narrative promulgated by the RPF to
legitimize its power and for putting an end
to impunity.
On November 23, 2006, a day after
Brugière issued the international warrants,
Rwanda removed its ambassador from
France. The two countries have not had
diplomatic relations since. In 2007, two
top Rwandan army generals named in the
indictment, Charles Kayonga and Jack

Nziza, filed a petition in a Belgian court
challenging its legality. The Rwandan
government also attempted to challenge
the legality of the indictments before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) but
France allegedly refused to submit to ICJ
jurisdiction, according to Rwandan newspapers. Finally, in the summer of 2008, a
Rwandan commission released a 500-page
report following a two-year investigation,
naming thirteen French political leaders, including former French president
François Mitterand and twenty military
officials, as complicit in aiding the genocide. Rwanda says it plans to indict some
of those named for their alleged political,
military, and diplomatic support for the
genocidal Hutu regime. Kagame spelled
out the tit-for-tat strategy for reporters in
Geneva, “[If] you indict our people, we
indict your people.”
Kabuye’s November 2008 arrest on the
two-year-old warrant in Germany, where
she traveled on a diplomatic mission,
has triggered protest from Rwandans and
debate among those trying to make sense of
the issues hidden in the political fog. Some
speculate that the Rwandan government
wanted to bring the issue to a head, because
Kabuye chose to travel to Germany after
being warned that the indictment would be
enforced, and then chose to be transferred
to France to face charges. Scholar Douglas
Yates of the American University of Paris
points out that the case illustrates fundamental problems in the structure of enforcement in international law, where powerful
states such as France can enforce their
international warrants but weaker states
cannot. During its annual summit in Addis
Abeba in early February 2009, the African
Union echoed the sentiment, condemning
Kabuye’s trial and also calling for a review
of the principle of universal jurisdiction,
which it said EU countries are abusing.
Certainly, Kabuye and the Rwandan
government seem to be winning media
sympathy. In Rwanda and other African
countries, she is portrayed as a martyr. The
December 2008 issue of Jeune Afrique, a
popular French-language magazine with
distribution across the continent, published
a long, sympathetic profile titled, “Me,
Rose Kabuye, prisoner of the French state.”
The day after Kabuye’s first day of trial, it
published an account according to her lawyers titled, “Habyarimana assassination:
Rose Kabuye has been able to give her version.” Both Voice of America and the Brit-
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ish Guardian have also published articles
leaning towards sympathetic. American
scholar Stephen Kinzer published an editorial in the Los Angeles Times hailing
Kagame as a reformer who has been bold
enough to stand up to France, and France as
bent on shifting blame for the genocide and
discrediting the Kagame regime since they
cannot overthrow it.
Meanwhile, a parallel scenario has been
playing out between Rwanda and Spain.
In February 2008, Judge Fernando Andreu
of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional issued
indictments for forty Rwandan military
members on charges of terrorism and genocide after the RPF took power in 1994.
The public response from the Rwandan
government was again quick and unequivocal: declaring the charges baseless, politically motivated, and questioning Andreu’s
method of investigation, which like Bruguière’s, never brought him to Rwanda.
To find some sense in the political
fog, it helps to turn to a humanitarian
voice. Shortly after Kabuye’s arrest, Paul
Rusesabagina, the man whose work was
dramatized in Hotel Rwanda, published a
thoughtful piece on his foundation’s website. He reminds us that neither the former
Hutu government nor the RPF genuinely
represent the people of Rwanda. “One of
the inconvenient truths of the genocide
aftermath involves the . . . numerous allegations of war crimes and crimes against
humanity when estimates of over 100,000
people were killed in retribution during
the Tutsi [RPF] conquest of the country.”
Rusesabagina calls the French indictment
“just the tip of the iceberg,” indicating
that the Spanish indictment focuses on the
more serious of RPF war crimes. Indeed,
though by no means neutral territory, Spain
could be a less politicized arena in which to
investigate charges against both Rwandan
and French officials.

Criminal Charges Used to
Repress Journalists: Cameroon,
Gabon, and Niger
The stories start to sound the same from
country to country. Managing editor of La
Détente Libre, Lewis Medjo, was convicted
of “spreading false news” on January 9,
2009 and sentenced to three years imprisonment in Cameroon. On the same day,
two journalists were released after ten days
in prison in Gabon, still facing charges for
“possessing a document with intent to dis-
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seminate propaganda that incites rebellion
against authorities,” a crime punishable
by up to five years in prison. Twelve days
later, Boussada Ben Ali, the managing editor of L’Action in Niger, was arrested for
“publishing a false news report,” punishable by three years imprisonment.
On the one hand, using the criminal
system to censure journalists may be a
step above the completely extra-judicial
beatings, office raids, disappearances, and
murders of journalists chronic in some
African countries. On the other hand, political use of the criminal law system strikes
a sharp chord in countries like Cameroon,
Gabon, and Niger where the most basic
crimes against citizens—robbery, rape,
murder—frequently go unreported and
unprosecuted.
The criminal libel charges against Lewis
Medjo relate to two articles published in La
Détente Libre. One suggested that President
Paul Biya was pushing the Supreme Court
president into early retirement; the other
reported an alleged attempt by the Delegate
General for National Security to extort
money from a businessman. Even after
Medjo’s conviction, it is unclear whether
these two articles were substantially true or
false. But, whether or not the publications
were libelous, a Reporters Sans Frontièrs
(“RSF”) press release claims, “This latest
sentence underlines the fact that African
jurisdictions far too often respond to press
offences by imprisoning journalists rather
than through fairer and more appropriate
solutions.”
The Medjo case follows a year of worsening political repression of the media in
Cameroon. The government crack-down
was triggered, at least in part, by violent
protests in February 2008 over rising cost
of living and a proposed constitutional
amendment to remove presidential term
limits (which passed in April 2008). During
the tense last week of February, government forces suddenly decided to enforce
licensing requirements to suspend a TV
station, seized equipment of a radio station,
effectively suspending its operation, and
stopped circulation of all privately-owned
newspapers. In May, two journalists were
arrested for writing about “the Albatross
affair” involving President Biya’s purchase
of an aircraft. They were charged with
“publishing the report of a judicial investigation that has not yet been tried,” punishable by up to two years in prison.

Because of outreach and mobilization
by La Détente Libre, Medjo’s case has
received more international attention than
others—but, his is by no means unique. On
January 16, 2009, the Committee to Protect
Journalists (CPJ) issued a public letter to
President Biya, in which they declared
Cameroon now “the second-worst jailor of
journalists in Africa.” The letter referred
to three other newspaper editors arrested
on charges of fraud, blackmail, insult, and
attempted extortion. Michel Mombio, Flash
Zacharie Ndiomo, and Armand Ondoa, each
detained for about three months already,
are currently standing trial.
In Gabon, international condemnation seems to have had more effect in
obtaining the release of politically detained
journalists. On December 30, 2008, two
journalists, Gaston Asseko of Radio SainteMarie and Léon Dieudonné Koungou of
Tendance Gabon, were arrested along
with three civil society leaders. They were
detained for a week before charges were
leveled for possession of a document, an
open letter published by a French-Gabonese journalist calling for an accounting
of financial management during Gabon
President Omar Bongo’s forty-year rule.
Following an overwhelming response from
international organizations, first Koungou
was released on January 7 and then Asseko
on January 9, 2009. Both still face charges
and, if convicted, up to five years imprisonment—merely for having a copy of an
open letter.
The most recent regional incident
involves Boussada Ben Ali, managing editor of L’Action in Niger, who published an
article on January 13, 2009 revealing a confidential trade deal and possible corruption
by finance minister Ali Mahaman Lamine
Zeine. Reports differ whether the trade
deal was with China or Japan. Also facing
charges that essentially amount to criminal
libel, Ben Ali could be sentenced to up to
three years imprisonment. According to an
RSF report, two years ago Niger drafted a
legal reform proposition to abolish prison
terms for defamation, but postponed plans
after an attack on army barracks by a
Tuareg independence group in 2007. The
government now claims it will have to wait
for a return to peace before any reforms
can proceed.

Middle East and
North Africa
Children in Gaza Bearing the
Brunt of the Conflict
According to the Palestinian Ministry of
Health, more than 400 children have been
killed in Gaza since the start of the Israeli
siege on December 27, 2008. The United
Nations has reported that children account
for one-third of the entire death toll. Children in Gaza have faced violence, shortages
of food and other resources, and a lack of
essential services, such as education and
medical care, since the conflict began. The
Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly states
that violence against civilians is “prohibited
at any time and in any place.” The Convention on the Rights of the Child similarly
urges countries to ensure that children are
not harmed during violent conflicts. Israel
has signed and ratified both of these conventions and now faces possible charges by
international courts for its alleged violation
of these conventions.
The International Criminal Court (ICC)
is currently considering whether the Palestinian Authority has the power to lodge a
complaint against Israel, and whether Israel’s actions constitute international crimes.
The legal issues at stake may take years
to resolve. Meanwhile, the international
community has expressed its concern for
the well-being of these children, who make
up more than half of the 1.5 million people
living in Gaza.
The most recent siege in Gaza began
when Israel launched a massive bombing
campaign targeting militants in response to
Hamas firing rockets into southern Israel.
Claiming that militants were hiding in
Gaza City, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
bombed civilian buildings, including three
schools operated by the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
which housed refugees. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and other news
agencies have reported incidents when children were killed in bombings and fired
at in close range by IDF soldiers as they
attempted to flee their homes with their
families. Although sources differ on the
number of civilians killed, the Israeli government has acknowledged that many children were inadvertently killed by bombing
and gunfire aimed at Hamas militants.
On January 21, 2009, Israel pulled its
ground troops out of Gaza. Both sides
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instituted a temporary cease-fire and seem
willing to negotiate a longer arrangement.
Meanwhile, Gaza’s students have returned
to re-opened schools where their missing
classmates’ empty desks stand as a silent
tribute to the many children who lost
their lives during the conflict. Although
the violence of the previous month has
subsided, children in Gaza continue to
suffer. A United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) official expressed concern over
their psychological state and their inability
to return to normal life: “Many kids have
stopped eating. They are inactive, they
barely talk, they cling to their parents
all the time.” Psychiatrists have already
reported that children in Gaza are having
trouble sleeping and eating, and are suffering from violent and emotional outbursts.
While life goes on in Gaza, so too will the
psychological effects of the conflict on
those children that survived.

Violence Against Peaceful
Protestors in Yemen
In January 2009, five demonstrators
were wounded in Aden when Yemeni police
opened fire on a group of army veterans
calling for equal employment opportunities. Yemeni security forces have killed,
wounded, and arrested peaceful protestors
after opening fire on multiple demonstrations over the last year. The protesters
spoke out primarily against political corruption and the conditions of Southern
Yemenis since the end of the 1994 civil
war. Local activists, international actors,
and human rights organizations have
denounced Yemen’s violent response to
the protests. The international community
has further criticized the Yemeni government’s lack of transparency. Concerns over
the repression of civil liberties abound as
demonstrations continue.
The seeds of the current human rights
situation in Yemen extend back to the
1994 civil war, which devastated Yemen
and divided it into two factions, consisting
of the current government and the opposition Socialist party. The Southern Socialists were defeated, and as a result, over
600,000 Yemenis went into exile, unwilling to join a unified Yemen under President
Ali Abdullah Saleh. The current administration granted those in exile amnesty
and invited them to return, but it has still
prevented Southern Yemenis from working
in military and government positions. This
ban is detrimental because military and

government positions constitute the majority of job opportunities in South Yemen.
In late 2007, tensions erupted in a wave of
demonstrations in South Yemen known as
the Southern Movement. Those taking part
in the demonstrations protested against the
lack of employment opportunities.
The first reported protest in the Southern Movement was in August 2007 in
the southern city of Aden. Police arrested
roughly 1,000 protestors and fired into the
crowd, killing one. Since then, security
forces have opened fire on at least five
other large-scale demonstrations and have
arrested hundreds of people. One witness
to the October 2007 protest in Radfan
reported that the police fired “indiscriminately” at protestors. Some of the protests
turned into riots. In January 2008, clashes
during a protest in Aden left three demonstrators and one policeman dead. During another demonstration in al-Hablain in
April 2008, police fired at over 5,000 demonstrators, wounding dozens, and arresting
120. Despite criticism for their use of force,
Yemeni security forces continue to respond
violently to demonstrators.
Investigations of excessive violence
rarely emerge from these incidents. In
September 2008, Amnesty International
reported that police had killed Walid Salih
Ubadi and another person during a peaceful
demonstration in al-Dali. Yemeni police
initiated an internal investigation, but it
has since stalled. Within the human rights
community, there is a serious fear that
Yemen will dissolve into a failed state as
it continues to use violence to address its
political problems.

Unfair Trials and Detentions
in Algeria
In February 2009, the Law Lords,
members of the House of Lords and the
United Kingdom’s highest court, approved
the deportation of two Algerian nationals to Algeria despite extensive proof that
they would face torture and unfair trials.
The Law Lords ruled that there were “no
reasonable grounds” to believe that the
Algerian government would torture the
detainees, known only as “RB” and “U.”
Both Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch (HRW), however, have provided evidence of Algeria’s use of unfair
trials, torture, and secret detentions masked
as counterterrorism measures.
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In July 2008, Abderrahmane Houari and
Mustafa Ahmed Hamlily were transferred
from Guantánamo Bay to Algeria to be
tried for their alleged links to terrorism.
They were held incommunicado for two
weeks with no access to their families or
lawyers—standard practice for detainees
deported to Algeria. In 2006, two Algerian
nationals were deported from Great Britain to Algeria, where they were arrested
for alleged ties to a terrorist organization,
tortured, and tried on coercive statements
obtained during their interrogations. Both
Amnesty and HRW call on Algeria to end
human rights violations against the detainees and to grant them access to a fair trial.
Algeria’s Department of Information
and Security (DRS) is renowned for its
harsh counterterrorism measures in the
wake of 9/11. Algeria has faced domestic
attacks from its own section of Al-Qaeda,
which claimed responsibility for bombings in 2008 that killed over 130 people.
Various human rights organizations accuse
the DRS of torturing Algerian nationals
deported from other countries on suspicion
of terror. In 2006, the U.S. State Department reported that security forces in Algeria were known to have tortured detainees.
One year later, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee (HRC) announced that
human rights non-governmental organizations had claimed the existence of “secret
detention centers” within Algeria. Algeria’s
National Commission for the Protection
and Promotion of Human Rights denied the
allegations and accused the groups of trying to damage Algeria’s reputation.
Despite the Algerian government’s
denial of wrongdoing, human rights organizations have uncovered the existence of
detainees who have been tortured or never
heard from again. In July 2008, Mohamed
Rahmouni was arrested outside his home in
Algiers. By the end of the 2008, his relatives were still unsure of his whereabouts.
Amnesty has also uncovered the cases of
Algerian nationals sent from other countries
on suspicion of being a part of a “terrorist
network.” In January 2008, Reda Dendani
was deported from the United States to one
of Algeria’s secret prisons, where he was
beaten and tortured by his guards. At his
trial, he claimed that that he had been tortured and that DRS guards had forced him
to sign a statement that he was not allowed
to see. He was sentenced to eight years in
prison and the Court did not investigate his
allegations. Both HRW and Amnesty report
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several similar cases where detainees were
tortured, held in secret prisons, and denied
access to a fair trial.
DRS’ notorious record of human rights
abuses has come under greater scrutiny
since 9/11. HRW has already criticized
Great Britain for continuing to deport
Algerian nationals with full knowledge
of Algeria’s use of unfair detention and
judicial practices. Under Article 3 of the
United Nations Convention Against Torture, refoulement, or the extradition of a
person to a state where he or she may be
subject to torture, is prohibited. Both the
United States and Great Britain have ratified the Convention but continue to deport
detainees to countries where they are at risk
of torture. Following President Obama’s
executive order closing Guantánamo Bay,
human rights organizations have expressed
concern that the U.S. government will
deport detainees to countries that mistreat their prisoners, including Algeria. The
organizations demand that Algeria start
providing fair and transparent detention
services and trials.

Europe
Disproportionate Police
Violence in Greece Leads to
Months of Civil Unrest
Police brutality in Greece sparked
months of violence after an officer shot
and killed a 15-year-old boy in December
2008. The shooting occurred in Athens’s
Exarchia district, a notorious hotspot for
clashes between Greek leftist groups and
local police. Although circumstances surrounding the incident are still unclear,
Greek police claim that two officers were
attacked by a group of youth. Bystanders
widely refute this report, saying the officers
verbally confronted the teens, eventually
firing three gunshots and a stun grenade at
the group. Teenager Alexandros Gregoropoulos was hit by one of the bullets, and
died later that evening.
Greek police have been the subject
of strong criticism in recent years, with
humanitarian groups documenting multiple
incidents of human rights abuses. In 2007,
the European Court of Human Rights maintained that Greece was in violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights
in regards to discriminatory treatment of
migrants and asylum-seekers. That same
year, multiple videos were posted online

depicting graphic scenes of Greek police
abusing detainees in police custody. International organizations maintain that police
continue to commit serious human rights
violations through excessive use of force,
misuse of firearms, and torture.
The death of Gregoropoulos intensified
the conflict, and rioting quickly spread
throughout the country. Almost immediately after the shooting, young protesters
threw Molotov cocktails in the streets of
Athens, burning cars and shops and setting
up flaming barricades. Although the government publicly condemned the killing, it
has been widely reported that officers were
instructed to take a defensive approach
to the riots. The country has since settled
into its first period of civil unrest in over
20 years.
Although violent protests were seen
in the days after the killing, thousands
of Greek citizens also came together in a
series of peaceful demonstrations. Officers were accused of targeting nonviolent
protesters and using extreme methods of
crowd control such as tear gas and flash
grenades. Multiple reports also emerged of
officers shooting into unarmed crowds and
beating bystanders. The clash between law
enforcement and Greek civilians has continued for several months, and international
spectators say the unrest is a sign of deeper
social problems, including corruption in
Greek state institutions and a continued
pattern of disproportionate violence from
police.
In the midst of international calls for
peace, the violence in Greece recently reignited as domestic terrorist groups carried
out multiple attacks across the country. In
early January, masked gunmen shot more
than 20 rounds into a crowd, critically
injuring a 21-year-old policeman. Revolutionary Struggle, best known for its grenade
attack on the U.S. Embassy in Athens two
years ago, claimed responsibility for the
attack, calling it “retaliation to the cowardly murder” of Gregoropoulos.
With human rights abuses being committed on both sides, the international community is calling for an end to the conflict.
Aid organizations suggest this can only
be accomplished with the continuation of
peaceable protests and an internal investigation of the alleged police abuses.
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Russia/Ukraine Dispute Causes
Gas Crisis in Europe
Years of tension between Russia and
Ukraine culminated in a major gas shortage
across Europe as supplies were cut off for
more than two weeks during January 2009.
Russian state-owned gas supplier Gazprom
and Ukrainian gas and oil company Naftohaz Ukrainy were in dispute over natural
gas supplies and costs, provoking Russia to
disconnect its gas supplies through Ukraine
on January 1st.
The cutoff was largely driven by political
discord between the two countries. Russia
was angered when Ukraine sought membership with the Northern Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alongside Georgia,
a country that engaged in a brief war with
Russia last year. Russia’s relationship with
the West also began to deteriorate as the
country experienced a serious economic
downturn. Oil and gas exports account for
more than half the Russian budget, and
intercontinental oil prices recently fell by
nearly 70%.
Facing an economic crisis, the country
sought to significantly increase the cost
of gas exports. Gazprom raised the price
Ukraine paid for gas from $180 to $450 per
1,000 cubic meters and requested billions
of dollars in what it claimed were late payments. Ukraine paid more than $1 billion
to cover the country’s debt, but refused to
pay the additional fines or the increased fee
for gas. Russia responded by halting its gas
exports to Ukraine.
This had a significant impact across
Europe, as Gazprom controls about a quarter of Europe’s gas supplies. Within days
of the cutoff, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Turkey all reported a 100% drop in
supplies from Ukranian pipelines carrying
Gazprom-supplied gas. By the time the
dispute was resolved two weeks later, 18
European countries had experienced major
declines or complete cutoffs in their gas
supplies.
As many European countries rely solely
on Gazprom for their gas supplies, this
cutoff came at an especially crucial time.
In the midst of frigid temperatures, several
countries were forced to shut down their
industrial heating plants and domestic heating systems to find alternative gas sources.
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Many citizens were unable to pay for electric heating as the temperature in places
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina fell to –14º
Celsius (6.8º Fahrenheit). Bulgarian breweries, chemical plants, and smelters closed
down, pushing the country further into an
economic depression. Slovakia declared
a state of emergency and halted gas supplies to companies and schools to preserve
resources for hospitals and homes.
President of the European Commission
(EC) José Manuel Barroso denounced the
cutoff, saying “it was utterly unacceptable that European gas customers were
held hostage to this dispute,” and that the
cut had come “without prior warning and
in clear contradiction of the reassurances
given by the highest Russian and Ukrainian
authorities.” In an effort to aid failing negotiation attempts, the EU sent delegations to
both Russia and Ukraine. On January 20,
negotiations between the countries were
finalized and Russia finally reopened its
gas taps.
In response to recent events, the EU
has discussed an alternative pipeline project that would provide some of Europe’s
gas supplies from Central Asia. The EU
insists this is not an anti-Russia project, but
an acknowledgement that the Committee
needs to increase energy security to avoid a
future similar stand-off.

Migrants Treated Inhumanely in
European Detention Centers
The inhumane treatment of migrant
detainees in European detention facilities
has drawn international attention amidst
growing concerns of extreme overcrowding
and excessive confinement periods. Accusations of inhumane treatment escalated
after footage of the conditions in a French
detention center were anonymously given
to international media and human rights
groups.
The images, taken at the Pamandzi
detention center, depict the deteriorating
conditions of the facility. The center often
surpasses its capacity of 60 by hosting more
than 220 detainees at a time. Without beds,
men, women and children crowd together
on mats on the floor. Many of the bathroom
facilities were broken and overflowing,
and biohazard bags were piled outside the
entryway. Pamandzi also lacks resources
specifically for children, and has no proper
medical facility.

Detainees in Greece are experiencing
similarly inhumane conditions, as the country was unprepared for a surge of detainees
in 2008. While the number of migrants
entering the island of Lesvos doubled in
2008, the island only hosts one detention
facility. The center has a capacity of 280
but has been known to house more than
990 detainees at a time. Those deemed
“irregular migrants” are placed in trailers
and rarely given the chance to go outside.
More than 150 people are forced to share
a bath and lavatory, and despite obvious
health risks the facility only has one doctor. Detainees’ access to lawyers is also
extremely limited.
Facilities in Italy are also strained to
accommodate the influx of migrant detainees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recently
traveled to Lampedusa, voicing concern
that overcrowding in the island’s facility
was “creating a humanitarian situation of
concern.” The facility, which has a capacity
of 850, was housing almost 2,000 detainees. Overcrowding forced many people to
sleep outside in the cold. In response, 700
detainees recently broke out of the detention center and staged a protest deploring
their living conditions and asking for freedom. Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi downplayed the problem, stating,
“There is no problem in Lampedusa. Those
who arrive there can move freely. It isn’t a
concentration camp. They’re free to go and
drink a beer.”
Although the European Union (EU)
promised to ensure that member states’
laws meet human rights standards, many
have voiced concern over a new EU directive allowing countries to detain migrants
for up to 18 months. Opponents fear that
the law will encourage countries with
shorter detention requirements, such as
Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands, to
lengthen them unnecessarily. The directive
also lends support to states such as Malta,
Germany, and Latvia who have already
implemented policies allowing detention
lasting up to 20 months. Human rights
organizations have called the directive
excessive and disproportionate, especially
given the current conditions of detention
facilities.
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South and Central Asia
India Seeks Extradition of
LeT Members
Between November 26 and 28, 2008,
ten armed terrorists killed at least 173
people and injured at least 308 in Mumbai,
India. The militants were armed, trained,
and directed by Pakistani based militant
outfit, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which India,
Pakistan, the United States, and others have
deemed a terrorist organization. American
and Indian intelligence officials believe
that the Pakistani intelligence service,
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has supported and protected LeT for years.
Arriving on Indian shores by boat from
Karachi, Pakistan, the terrorists proceeded
to seize control of the Taj Mahal Hotel,
Oberoi Trident Hotel, and Nariman House,
a Jewish community center. The remaining
militants proceeded to fire AK-47 rifles
indiscriminately and launched grenades in
the crowded Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus
train station. The militants also opened fire
at Cama Hospital and Leopold Café, which
are heavily frequented by tourists.
Meanwhile, the other terrorists proceeded to set fire to both the hotels and held
hostages there in addition to those captured
in Nariman House. Numerous occupants
of the three buildings were killed and doctors who received victims from the siege
reported signs of torture amongst the dead.
Indian commandos raided the hotels and
the Jewish community center, killing nine
of the terrorists and freeing the remaining occupants. Mohammad Ajmal Kasab,
a Pakistani citizen, is the only member
of the group that was arrested and currently awaits criminal proceedings in India.
Despite the capture of one operative, India
seeks possession of other LeT members
who helped effectuate the attack.
India has urged Pakistan to extradite
senior members of LeT believed to be
involved in the attack, but Pakistan has
resisted extradition citing the lack of an
extradition treaty between the two countries.
Some Indian commentators have urged
extradition under the SAARC Regional
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism,
a regional instrument that both India and
Pakistan have adopted. The Convention,
however, is largely impotent to extradite
suspected terrorists since it affords state
parties receiving the extradition request the
choice of whether to extradite.
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Under severe international pressure, the
Pakistani government assumed control of
Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s (JuD) headquarters, a
front organization for LeT. Government
officials are allegedly monitoring activities at the headquarters and reports say that
some senior LeT leaders are under house
arrest in Pakistan, yet reports differ as to
the extent of their freedom of movement
and activity. Pakistan has not outlawed JuD
despite a United Nations resolution declaring it to be a banned terrorist organization.
As part of its own investigation, Pakistan
claims to have arrested over a hundred people, closed militant training camps, offices,
schools, and websites linked to JuD. It is
far from certain, however, whether suspects
will be prosecuted in Pakistan. The leader
of JuD, Hafiz Saeed, is currently under
house arrest, but he has been placed under
house arrest at least twice since 2001 and
was eventually freed. Some commentators, such as India’s former intelligence
chief Ajit Doval, believe Pakistan is insincere about its partial crackdown on JuD.
Doval alleges that the partial crackdown
on JuD is “designed to save the state from
embarrassment.”
In addition to the issues surrounding
the prosecution and extradition of those
involved in the Mumbai attacks, the Indian
government has also grappled with domestic legal reform of its terrorism laws. Shortly
after the attacks, the Indian Parliament
passed the National Investigation Agency
(NIA) Act and amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
The NIA Act establishes a new federal
investigative agency that will investigate
and prosecute national level crimes, such
as terrorism. The Act also creates special
courts, which will speedily try all offenses
the NIA has authority to prosecute. While
the long established Central Bureau of
Investigation could only assume power
over a state’s investigation or prosecution
with permission from that state, the NIA is
authorized to take over these state activities
at its own discretion.
While the NIA Act has changed
f ederal-state dynamics, the UAPA amendments have altered the power dynamic
between the federal government and individual suspects. The amendments have
extended the period that law enforcement
can hold terrorist suspects in pre-trial detention without charges from 90 to 180 days,
provided that a court grants the extension.

The amendments also allow a court, at the
request of the prosecutor, to deny bail to
suspects if it finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation
against the suspect is prima facie true.
Bail for non-Indians who enter the country
illegally is denied except in very special
circumstances that are left undefined.
Not only do the UAPA amendments
extend detention power, but they also mandate courts to presume guilt in certain
cases. If arms, explosives, or other materials believed to be used in the offense
are recovered from the accused, or if the
fingerprints of the accused are found at the
site of the offense on objects allegedly used
in the offence, the court must presume that
the accused has committed the offense. The
presumption is only disproved under sufficient evidence rebutting the presumption of
guilt. Some commentators, such as prominent lawyer and academic Rajeev Dhavan,
believe that the UAPA amendments violate
core civil liberties. Dhavan asserts that the
amendments are “founded on the principle
that everyone is suspicious or a suspect”
and that over-ambitious law enforcement
personal will arrest innocents as the “wrath
of subjective suspicion will override the
entire due process of the Criminal Code.”
While the Indian government struggles
with balancing the need for effective prosecution and security with civil liberties,
the Pakistani civilian government walks a
tightrope between appearing tough on terrorism while avoiding the ire of the powerful military establishment who allegedly
collude with organizations such as JuD.

Kazakhstani Journalist Arrested
On January 6, 2009, a Kazakhstani
j ournalist, Ramazan Yesergepov, was
arrested and detained by the Kazakh
National Security Committee (CNS) while
undergoing treatment for hypertension at a
hospital in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Yesergepov was arrested under suspicion of divulging state secrets in contravention to Kazakh
Criminal Code Article “Illegal Receipt or
Disclosure of State Secrets” for publishing internal documents from the CNS.
The documents were labeled classified and
reportedly dealt with CNS attempts to
influence a prosecutor and a judge in a tax
case regarding a local company.
Subsequent to the arrest, the CNS
raided the Yesergepov’s offices, confiscating computer drives. Yesergepov went
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on a hunger strike because a CNS investigation poses a conflict of interest since
the subject of his article and the published
memos regarded CNS corruption. His wife
claims that he will not end the fast until his
case is moved to a different agency.
According to Human Rights Watch,
arrests and imprisonment of journalists
are rare in Kazakhstan; however, journalists operate in a climate of anxiety
which prohibits a functioning free press.
Contrary to the classification of libel in
many countries, the Kazakhstan government may bring criminal libel suits against
journalists. In 2008, at least seven criminal
libel suits against journalists were filed.
Furthermore, civil libel suits against journalists are common, and no cap on defamation awards exists.
For instance, Romin Madinov, a
Kazakhstani parliamentarian, filed suit
against the widely distributed opposition/independent newspaper Taszharghan
regarding an article about Madinov’s plausible links to prior incidents of corruption.
The judge ordered a judgment for Madinov in the amount of $25,000. In addition
to libel suits, journalists have reported a
sense of fear due to alleged surveillance of
their communications and movements.
Taszharghan, however, is one of the
few independent newspapers in Kazakhstan. Many news sources are owned by the
Kazakhstani government, and therefore do
not criticize politicians nor governmental
policies. Some of the largest newspapers
are owned directly by the government,
who appoint the editor in chief and effectually making the publication a mouthpiece for the central government.
Despite the heavy burdens on journalists, Kazakhstan has recently taken a
small, incremental step towards liberalizing its media laws. As a member of the
Organization for Security Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), a large intergovernmental
organization dealing with security and
human rights, Kazakhstan will assume the
OSCE chairman position in 2010. Before
assuming this position, Kazakhstan agreed
to liberalize its media and election laws
and passed media law amendments in
January 2009.
On February 6, 2009, President Nursul
tan Nazarbayev signed into law the amendments to the mass media law that was earlier
approved by Parliament. The amendments
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eliminate registration requirements for television and radio media outlets. Furthermore, the reforms shift the legal burden in
defamation suits. Rather than requiring the
defendant to prove the allegedly defamatory
statements are true, the party who initiated
the suit must now prove they are false.
Adil Soz, a Kazakhstani non-governmental organization that advocates for a
free press, criticizes the reform. The group
asserts that even though registration with
the government for television and radio
outlets is abolished, the legal requirement
to obtain a license remains in force. Nevertheless, the president of Adil Soz, Tamara
Kaleeva, claimed that the amendments are
important as a first step towards greater
liberalization. Miklós Haraszti, an OSCE
representative on freedom of media, welcomed the amendments but also urged the
Kazakhstani government to further liberalize by reducing governmental ownership
of media, decriminalizing libel, and abolishing criminal suits against journalists
who reveal classified information.

East and Southeast Asia
Critics Question Effectiveness
of New Indonesian
Anti-discrimination Laws
Indonesia passed new legislation
addressing racial and ethnic discrimination on October 28, 2008; however, various human rights groups have criticized
its effectiveness, citing narrow coverage.
The legislation focuses more on racial
and ethnic discrimination and only covers
discrimination committed by individuals
or discrimination in the workplace. The
law does not address discrimination by
government officials or institutions. The
new legislation lacks mention of religion
because lawmakers felt that religion was
encompassed within ethnicity. While some
believe this adequately protects against
religious discrimination, others criticizing the legislation feel that religion was
not explicitly addressed as a compromise
between different factions of the legislator.
Indonesia has a long history of religious
and gender discrimination. The government, for the most part, fails to protect the
constitutional rights of religious minorities. By its reluctance to take appropriate
action to punish the perpetrators of these
crimes, the state has essentially allowed
various forms of religious discrimination

and attacks to continue. A prime example would be discrimination against the
Ahmadiyah sect by mainstream Islamic
organizations who demand the Indonesian government ban them. The inaction
on the part of law enforcement regarding
attacks on their places of worship and the
public attacks on their beliefs is interpreted
as approval, thus resulting in increased
violence and the attempt by a number of
Muslim groups to force the President to ban
the sect.
Indonesian lawmakers attested to the
fact that the law passed only after many
days of debate. Islamic parties were allegedly strongly opposed to any mention of
religious or sexual orientation discrimination, forcing them out of the bill. As a
result, after its passage, many human rights
organizations criticized the bill for its narrow coverage and found it to be facially
ineffective.
However narrow its coverage may be,
others in the human rights community have
found the passage of the bill as a positive
step towards justice and equality in Indonesia. Ahmad Baso, a member of the National
Commission on Human Rights (Komnas
HAM), said the commission welcomed
the new law despite its perceived shortcomings. Komnas HAM was established
by Presidential Decree in 1993 and works
independently of the state government to
conduct research, monitor, mediate, and
investigate issues of human rights.
Already, standing Indonesian law recognizes the political and social equality of
women; however, many feel that gender
discrimination is still pervasive in society.
For example, only six percent of women
civil servants occupy positions of authority. Women represent the majority of the
workers in the textile, garment and footwear factories and are often bypassed for
positions of authority. Furthermore, feminist movements were fervently stifled and
progressive women’s organizations banned
until just recently. The root of much discrimination against women in Indonesia
also rests within the Muslim community,
which still practices female genital mutilation and allows marriage once a female
reaches puberty in some rural parts of the
country.
Many have high hopes that the AntiDiscrimination bill will grow to include
religious, gender, and sexual orientation
discrimination in the future. As the legisla-
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tion is put into effect, some human rights
and religious organizations are thinking
of placing the law under judicial review
in hopes of creating a more inclusive and
effective law. Despite its possible shortcomings, the Indonesian law seems to
have a strong base and can be a positive
step forward in the name of human rights.
Addressing some forms of discrimination
presently can pave the way for more expansive legislation in the future. Enforcing the
present law, while simultaneously working to expand its reach, may be the most
effective way to address the nation’s social
construct.

Thai Court Finds Soldiers to
Blame in Imam’s Death
A court in Narathiwat, Thailand shed
light on the torture and brutality employed
by the Thai army when it ruled that a number of soldiers were to blame for the death
of a Muslim Imam on December 25, 2008.
The ruling came shortly after the election of
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who has
vowed to bring an end to the use of torture
and restore justice to the violence-strewn
southern provinces of Thailand, such as
Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani.
Soldiers sent to quell separatist insurgents in the south detained, interrogated,
and then tortured to death Imam Yapa
Kaseng in March 2008. The coroner’s report
determined that the cause of Imam Yapa’s
death was blunt-force trauma, including rib
fractures from the front, side, and back that
punctured his lungs. Bruises and wounds
were found all over his body, including his
eyes, forehead, and lips. Imam Yapa also
had long abrasion marks on his back, indicating that he may have been dragged some
distance by his ankles.
The Imam Yapa’s fate is not uncommon with the Thai government’s counterinsurgency operations throughout the
south. There is widespread mistreatment of
Muslims in army custody, many of whom
have come forth and testified to being
tortured by interrogators both in army and
civilian clothing. Various news organizations reported that throughout the ongoing
conflict in the south, Muslims had been tortured, deprived of their basic human rights,
and killed while held in Thai prisons and
camps. Forms of torture include suffocation due to the “stacking” of prisoners, earslapping, punching, kicking, beatings with
wooden and metal clubs, forced nudity,
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exposure to cold temperature, electric
shock, strangulation, and suffocation with
plastic bags.
Muslims also complain about discrimination in daily life. Thailand’s Muslims are
largely concentrated in the four southern
provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songhkla
and Yala; areas which are considerably
less developed than the cities of northern
Thailand. Muslim inhabitants of these areas
complain of government discrimination
and find that they are at a disadvantage
in comparison to the country’s Buddhist
majority. Education is insufficient, jobs
are scarce and difficult to obtain, and basic
forms of government assistance are more
or less unavailable.
After assuming office on December
17, 2008, Prime Minister Abhisit spoke
out against the acts of torture and violence
against Muslims in the conflict and has
stated that justice will be the driving force
behind a resolution to the violent conflict
that has stretched over 30 years. Though
military sweeps and mechanisms such as
the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) are in place to prevent such deviant acts, they are unable to
function properly due to army interference.
Furthermore, the Decree on Government
Administration in Emergency Situations
(Emergency Decree), a relic of former
Prime Minister Thaksin’s administration,
gives soldiers considerable leeway and
breeds an atmosphere where virtually no
disciplinary measures exist.
The Narathiwat court’s ruling in the
death of Imam Yapa is viewed as a crucial
victory in the battle against torture and
human rights violations in this region.
Many hope that Prime Minister Abhisit
will press forward with the ruling and take
further initiative to stop abuses against
Muslims in the south.

Khmer Krom Buddhists
Imprisoned in Vietnam
A recent demonstration by Theravada
Buddhists in the Mekong Delta ended in
violence when Vietnamese officials raided
and imprisoned several of the Khmer Krom
monks and political activists who were
protesting against the detention of former
monk Tim Sakhorn, as well as state-sponsored discrimination of their religious and
political beliefs. The Vietnamese government was criticized for its mistreatment
of the protesters as part of its on-going

oppression of the Khmer Krom Buddhists
in southern Vietnam. Highly suspicious of
a possible nationalist movement within the
ethnic Khmer, the Vietnamese government
actively discriminates against the minority and suppresses demonstrations calling
attention to the mistreatment.
The ethnic Khmer are indigenous to
the southern regions of Vietnam and are
presently the ethnic and religious minority
in and around the Mekong Delta. Inhabiting the area long before the arrival of the
Vietnamese, the Khmer people have a
distinct background and religious belief,
causing tension and strife with the Communist government in Hanoi. Though
recently established organizations such as
the Khmer Krom Federation Youth Committee, the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation (KKF) and various NGOs have
brought attention to the matter, Western
media has largely ignored the plight of
the Khmer Krom. Reports by these organizations show that the Khmer face severe
violations against their basic religious and
human rights.
The Khmer face much difficulty in
practicing their religion. They, like many
Cambodian and Thai people, are Theravada
Buddhists, unlike the Vietnamese who are
predominantly Mahayana Buddhists and
Roman Catholics. The Vietnamese government does not officially recognize their
existence, and in fact, identify Theravada
monks as having no religion. The KKF
reports that Theravada monks at times face
forced renunciation of their faith, arbitrary
arrests, and public defrocking.
The Khmer minority in the Delta are
forced to adopt Vietnamese last names,
speak the Vietnamese language, and have
difficultly finding jobs outside of the fields.
Their property is subject to confiscation
and destruction by the state without due
process. The KKF also have reported that
Hanoi neglects basic education for children
in the Khmer community and that state
health services are often not available to
them. The recent epidemic of blindness
affecting children in the Delta was barely
addressed and continues to go largely
untreated.
Theravada monks stage regular protests
against the Vietnamese government calling
for greater religious freedom, better access
to healthcare, and more Khmer- based
education; however, Mahayana Buddhist
government officials have done nothing
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but stifle the protests. This recent protest
mirrors the infamous February 2007 protest
in which government officials expelled 20
monks from the monkhood and drove them
out of their pagodas. Many were imprisoned or placed under house arrest. There
were further reports of police brutality and
corruption of justice; five were arrested
without warrants, were never charged with
specific crimes, and were convicted and
sentenced in May 2007.
The KKF and the Khmer Krom Federation
Youth Committee have organized and created a network to preserve their ethnic history and to provide the Khmer with a strong,
unified voice against the state-sponsored
discrimination. They now call for the government in Hanoi to release the imprisoned
monks and restore those banished from the
monkhood to their pagodas.
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